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To what extent is a child responsible for his conduct? On what
basis is his fault in negligence actions to be measured? Is he to be
held to an adult standard of care, or is his youth and inexperience
to be considered in determining his liability? Questions concerning
a child's capacity to be negligent or contributorily negligent have
received extensive judicial discussion and legal commentary.' Al-
though there is general agreement that a child is to be treated more
leniently by the law than an adult, the methods for measuring his
responsibility and fault vary considerably from state to state.2 In the
recent case of Ranard v. O'Neil,3 the Montana supreme court syn-
thesized prior Montana decisions on the contributory negligence of
children and formulated the test by which a child's standard of care
and capacity for negligence are to be measured in this jurisdiction.
The principles of Ranard, although articulated in the context of
contributory negligence, nevertheless provide useful guidelines for
the determination of the relative fault of children in comparative
negligence cases.
1I. THE ISSUES RAISED BY RANARD
In the Ranard case, the child plaintiff, whose eighth birthday
was the day following the accident, was struck by the defendant's
car in the street in front of his home. His older brother had just
crossed the street, and the plaintiff followed him immediately, not
noticing the defendant's car until he was in the middle of the street.
In depositions the plaintiff admitted that he had not looked before
running into the street, although he had been instructed on pedes-
trian safety and knew he should check for traffic. The defendant was
granted summary judgment on the finding that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The issues presented on appeal, according to the supreme
court, were whether the plaintiff had the capacity to be contributo-
rily negligent, and if so, whether he was in fact contributorily negli-
gent.' The first issue therefore requires the ascertainment of the
1. Annot., 107 A.L.R. 4 (1937); Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1080 (1948).
2. Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 917 (1961).
3. Ranard v. O'Neil, - Mont. -, 531 P.2d 1000 (1975).
4. Id. at 1001.
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particular child's capacity, that is, ". . . his ability to appreciate
the danger. . of the act alleged to be negligent." 5 The second issue
requires the measurment of the child's actual conduct against the
applicable standard of care.'
I. CAPACITY AND STANDARD OF CARE IN MONTANA
A. Children under Seven
It has long been the rule in Montana that a child under the age
of seven cannot, as a matter of law, be held contributorily negli-
gent.' The reason given in Montana for the rule is that such children
are non suijuris, that is, lacking in the capacity to manage their own
affairs.' Other courts have used similar reasoning for presuming
children under seven incapable of contributory negligence,9 al-
though the rule has been sternly criticized' ° and has been aban-
doned in most jurisdictions." Regardless of the criticism of the pre-
sumption, "... it has been the law in Montana for forty years. '"'
B. Children over Seven
In Ranard and two earlier Montana cases, Lesage v. Largey
Lumber Co.'3 and Graham v. Rolandson,'4 the court was dealing
with the issue of contributory negligence in children over seven and
could not avail itself of the presumption relating to younger chil-
dren. The question in these cases, therefore, was how to determine
the capacity and standard of care for children over seven.
In Lesage, an eight-year old boy, who was playing football in
the street, was injured when he was struck by the defendant's car.
The court, in refusing to rule that the plaintiff was guilty of contri-
5. Id. at 1002.
6. Discussion of judicial uses of the terms "capacity" and "standard of care" appears
in: Keet, Contributory Negligence of Children, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 404 (1963); Note,
Contributory Negligence of Children in Indiana: Capacity and Standard of Care. 34 IND. L.
J. 511 (1959).
7. Gilligan v. City of Butte, 118 Mont. 350, 166 P.2d 797, 805 (1946); Johnson v. Her-
ring, 89 Mont. 420, 300 P. 535, 538 (1931); Burns v. Eminger, 81 Mont. 79, 261 P. 613, 615
(1927); Conway v. Monidah Trust et al., 47 Mont. 269, 132 P. 26, 27 (1913).
8. Burns v. Eminger, supra note 7 at 615.
9. Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1958); Tyler v. Weed, 285
Mich. 460, 280 N.W. 832 (1938).
10. "A rule that age, not sense; years, not intelligence; length of life, not experience,
should govern responsibility for human action is unsound and should be discarded." Tyler,
supra note 9 at 840 (dissenting opinion).
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 156 (4th ed. 1971); Annot., 77
A.L.R.2d 917 (1961).
12. Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263, 267 (1967).
13. Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., 99 Mont. 372, 43 P.2d 896 (1935).
14. Graham v. Rolandson, supra note 12.
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butory negligence as a matter of law, proposed the following test for
determining the standard of care for children over seven:
Did he or did he not exercise the degree of care that can ordinarily
be expected of children of the same age, taking into consideration
their experience, intelligence, and capabilities?'5
Under this test, the particular child is compared to other children
of "his own age and understanding,"'" and his conduct is judged by
what they might reasonably be expected to do in a given situation.
Similar standards of care, with slight variations in terminology, are
imposed on children in most other jurisdictions" and are espoused
by legal theoreticians as generally accepted criteria.'8
In the Lesage case, the court focused on the standard of care to
be applied to the child's conduct. In the later Graham case, the
court directed its attention to the child's capacity to be contributo-
rily negligent and articulated the "dual inquiry"" later used by the
court in Ranard. In Graham an eight-year old boy, while riding his
bicycle, was struck and killed by the defendant's car. The court
stated that the determination of contributory negligence in children
over seven required the following two findings:
(1) The capacity of a particular child in a given case to be contribu-
torily negligent; and (2) The establishment in fact of the particular
child's contributory negligence under the circumstances of a given
case .20
The court went on to hold that in Montana there is no presumption
as to the capacity or incapacity of an eight-and-a-half year old to
be contributorily negligent and that the issue of capacity is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined on the basis of the individual child in
the individual case.
2 '
C. Ranard v. O'Neil
With the Lesage and Graham tests before it, the Montana su-
15. Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., supra note 13 at 900.
16. Id. at 901.
17. Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657, 660 (Alaska 1964) (using the terms "age,
intelligence, and experience"); Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331, 106 N.E.
837, 839 (1914) (using the terms "age, intelligence, capacity, discretion and experience");
Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 95 N.E. 876, 878 (1911) (using the words
"age, intelligence, and experience"); Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified School District, 53 C.2d
544, 348 P.2d 887, 894, 2 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960) (using the terms "age, capacity and experi-
ence").
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965); PROSSER, supra note 11 at 155.
19. Graham v. Rolandson, supra note 12 at 267.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 268.
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preme court in Ranard sought to combine the notions of capacity
and standard of care as applicable to children over seven who are
charged with negligence or contributory negligence. Other courts,
too, have attempted to deal with these notions with a combined
capacity and standard of care approach and have reached varying
conclusions. One court has dealt with capacity as a matter of law,
while finding the applicable standard of care to be a question of
fact. 2 Others have treated capacity as a subjective determination
and standard of care as an objective determination.? The Montana
court in Ranard has articulated what appears to be a novel solution
to the problems raised in determining a child's negligence. The
issues of both capacity and standard of care are determined by
subjective criteria relating only to the particular child, and are de-
cided as questions of fact, generally by the jury.
24
1. Capacity
In the test set forth in Ranard, the determination of the particu-
lar child's capacity to be contributorily negligent is the dominant
and controlling element. The capacity of a child is ". . . his ability
to appreciate the danger, either to himself or others, of the act
alleged to be negligent."' '25 The factors to be considered are the
child's ". . . age, experience, intelligence and capabilities."26 The
only indication in Graham of the type of information necessary for
determining a child's capacity was that such information must go
beyond age and grade in school.27 In Ranard, however, the court
furnishes more detailed guidelines as to the evidence required for
establishing capacity. Evidence of intelligence, for instance, must
be specific; inferences of intelligence may not be drawn merely from
the child's responses to depositions, as they were by the trial court
in granting summary judgment.2 A showing of experience in the
type of conduct alleged to be negligent is also necessary and must
go beyond comparisons with other children of the same age as well
as beyond evidence of instruction in the general activity. 9 Finally,
the child's capabilities must be established, providing the court and
the jury with a means of judging the child's personality, his
22. Patterson v. Cushman, supra note 17 at 660.
23. Brown v. Connolly, 62 C.2d 391, 398 P.2d 596, 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. 324, 11 A.L.R.3d
1348 (1965); Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, supra note 17.
24. Ranard v. O'Neil, supra note 3 at 1002.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Graham v. Rolandson, supra note 12 at 268.
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attention-span, his independence, or his forgetfulness."
From the court's discussion, it is obvious that detailed evidence
is required to establish a given child's capacity for negligence.
Grades from school, testimony from teachers, evidence of the extent
and nature of the particular child's former participation in the con-
duct complained of, and information on his personality traits would
all be relevant in ascertaining his ability to appreciate the danger
involved in a given situation. The production of such evidence is
vital to both the plaintiff's and the defendant's cases in persuading
the jury of the child's capacity or incapacity. In certain cases, the
evidence presented may even be sufficient for the court to rule on
the issue of capacity as a matter of law.
3'
2. Standard of Care
The novelty of the Montana approach to the question of a
child's contributory negligence is the standard of care to which the
child is held. In Lesage the standard of care was phrased in terms
of ordinary children of the same age and understanding.3 2 This stan-
dard, widely accepted by the courts and authorities, sets up a fic-
tional counterpart or group of counterparts to the particular child
and measures the child's conduct against the ordinary conduct of
his imaginary peers.3 In Ranard, however, the Montana supreme
court appears to be discarding the fictional counterpart or peer
group standard in favor of a personal standard for the particular
child involved in the lawsuit. As stated by the court:
His [the child's] negligence in fact can only be determined by
finding a failure to conform his conduct to a standard of care which
he can reasonably observe, given the limitations of his capacity. 34
(emphasis added)
No longer is there any reference to other children of the same or
similar capacity, maturity, or intelligence, as there was in Lesage.
Instead, a highly personal and subjective standard of care is applied
to each child on an individual basis.
According to the principles voiced in Ranard, the child's stan-
dard of care cannot be determined until his capacity is established. 5
The limits of that capacity, determined from evidence as to his age,
intelligence, experience, and capabilities, govern and prescribe the
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., supra note 13 at 900.
33. See cases, supra note 17.
34. Ranard v. O'Neil, supra note 3 at 1002.
35. Id. at 1003.
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standard of care applicable to the child. He must conform his con-
duct to this personal and subjective standard of care; he must, in
essence, live up to his personal capacity or be found guilty of negli-
gence.
Although the formulation of subjective tests for both capacity
and standard of care tends to obfuscate the distinction between the
two concepts, the same criticism has also been leveled at the use of
a subjective determination of capacity and objective application of
standard of care .3 Varying individual factors of background, capa-
bility, intelligence, and maturity must necessarily be considered in
judging the conduct of children. Attempting first to find a child's
capacity for negligence by looking to his personal characteristics
and then to fashion an objective standard for his conduct from the
conduct of hypothetical children of similar capacity is, at best, a
confusing process for judge or jury. In Montana, this intermingling
of the subjective with the objective is no longer required. Once a
child is found to have the capacity for negligence, there is no need
to back away from his individuality in judging his particular con-
duct. Instead, his personality and individuality form the basis not
only for his capacity but also for the standard of care to which he is
held. When a child's conduct is judged in Montana, the question
posed is whether this particular child in these particular circum-
stances performed as he personally could be expected to perform.
The emphasis remains on subjective factors throughout the process
of determining negligence. Such an emphasis seems both more
workable and more realistic in the light of the special status ac-
corded to children by the law.
D. Children over Fourteen
Although the court in Ranard was dealing with cases specifi-
cally concerning children between the ages of eight and nine, the
language used in the summarizing of the general rule is not limited
by age group.37 It should be remembered, however, that children
under seven are incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of
law .3 Likewise, in Sherris v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.," the court
stated that children fourteen or over are presumed, as a matter of
law, to be capable of contributory negligence. It would seem likely
that the same types of evidence necessary to establish capacity or
incapacity of children under fourteen will be necessary to overcome
this presumption.
36. Keet, supra note 6 at 403.
37. Ranard v. O'Neil, supra note 3 at 1002.
38. See cases, supra note 7.
39. Sherris v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 55 Mont. 189, 175 P. 269, 270 (1918).
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The Montana case of Ranard v. O'Neil represents the culmina-
tion of the Montana supreme court's efforts to establish criteria for
determining the negligence and contributory negligence of children
over seven. The first step in the determination is to ascertain the
capacity of the particular child to be contributorily negligent, from
evidence presented as to his age, experience, intelligence, and capa-
bilities. It is only after the child's capacity is determined that a
standard of care for his conduct may be established. According to
Ranard, this standard of care is personal and individual to each
particular child. It is not a standard derived from the conduct of
hypothetical children of the same age and understanding; instead,
it is a standard set by the child for himself, bounded by the limits
of his own capacity to realize the dangers of a given situation. A
child's capacity to be contributorily negligent defines his standard,
and his conduct must conform to his particular standard.
Although contributory negligence is no longer a complete de-
fense in Montana, the Ranard case and the principles it sets forth
on children and negligence law will form important bases for deter-
mining relative fault in comparative negligence cases. A child must
still be found capable of negligence, and the extent of that negli-
gence can only be found by measuring his conduct against the de-
gree of care required of him by the law. Because the Ranard case
establishes the criteria for determining both capacity and standard
of care for children, its general principles should remain valid in
controversies involving comparative negligence.
19761
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